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Taylor and after: paradigms in the history of management1 
BALÁZS VASZKUN 
 
This paper seeks to answer the question “Why and how management practices and ideas 
changed over time?” We assume that the history of management can be defined by several 
“paradigms” and the study of their evolution can provide an answer. 
The history of management in the US from 1900 to 2000 can be defined as a set of 
different paradigms with different managerial dilemmas, solutions and main advocates for 
each. We refer to these management paradigms as “Scientific Management”, “Human 
Relations”, “Structural Revolution” and “Global Competition”, this last one being proposed 
by the author. Their evolution coincides with the development of the practice of management 
in corporations. These paradigms followed each other but did not “die” when the next 
emerged, only faded somewhat, so the author assumes it is normal that practices, ideas and 
tools from each still prevail today. As a synthesized teaching of management history, the 
author identifies two main types of paradigm which can help the readers to evaluate the 
development and the national states of management system of different industrialized 
countries. Thus, the general framework of this paper can serve as a means to better 
understand management both in theory and in practice. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper shortly reviews management theories from the 1910s to the present day. Our 
objective is to place Taylor in a historical perspective in order to better grasp his contribution 
to the management studies. Based on his Scientific Management theory, other “management 
paradigms” will be identified which followed his era. In this introduction, we will look at how 
the first large enterprises were created, able to develop a conscious management and scientific 
practices in production, and define what we understand under management paradigm. 
The birth of modern factories is greatly due to the railway constructions which brought 
the “revolution” of transportation, bigger markets, separating ownership and management (as 
few were being able to finance alone a complete railway line), and growing companies with 
more hierarchical levels. For the governance problems caused by professional managers, like 
differences in personal goals or performance information, the development of agency theory 
was to give a solution. 
By the Civil War, the interchangeability of parts in production (first in weaponry) could 
be established, and so standardization with less skilled labor became reality. In addition, from 
the 1870s, a growing number of continuous-process machinery were introduced in American 
factories in order to increase the volume of production (Locke 1996). The industrializing 
world entered in an era dominated by the power of economies of scale, where the first priority 
of the firms was growth2. The steam power made mechanized production cheaper, so prices 
could be lowered as well. Lower prices meant higher demand which pushed factories to 
employ more workers, buy more machines; and this race could be won only by those who 
achieved the cheapest prices by larger-scale production. By the 1900s, the aspect of scale 
turned to be a great advantage on the yet relatively more developed Western-European 
economies. As argued by Litterer (1961), technical skills and innovation in America was not 
used to make products, as in Europe, but to make production lines. To sum up, the key drivers 
                                                 
1 This conference paper was partly supported by the TÁMOP-4.2.1/B-09/1/KMR-2010-005 project. 
2 Skaggs and Leicht (2005) call this period (1860-1910) Entrepreneurialism. 
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behind the rise of Big Business in the late 1880s were technology, management, mass 
markets, and economies of scale and scope (Koehn 2009). 
However, management of those ever growing companies presented a serious challenge, 
because their owners were lacking professional training or any kind of education about how to 
organize and coordinate the work of so many at the same time. In addition, an important part 
of workers were illiterate or, due to the immigration, could not even speak English. 
In those early times management faced multiple problems. The most serious were 
recruitment, especially that of skilled labor, training of the uneducated, unmotivated workers, 
and keeping discipline (Wren 1994). The given responses included using “stick” 
(punishment), “carrot” (rewards, bonuses) and building a sort of “factory ethos”, often linked 
to religious morals and values, in order to stabilize hierarchy.  
People were learning from their co-workers, production did not have standardized 
methods, and innovation was often blocked or resisted by labor. Employers promoted low 
wages because when a worker got enough money to survive for a few days, he or she simply 
did not return to work for that time. Workers did not make long term plans, or saved money; 
and management also operated in the same, ad-hoc way, without serious experience-transfer 
or conscious methods. It was believed that a good manager is merely made by the personality 
and owners recruited mainly family members in managerial positions, simply as a matter of 
trust. 
Standardized mass-production required a more professional management, different of 
the previous manufacturing systems supervised by family owners. Large firms reached a size 
where their owners could not directly supervise work and train workers by themselves. This 
new management style emerged under the name of “Scientific Management”, which we will 
examine as our first paradigm. 
When speaking about the term “paradigm”, we do not want to enter into full details 
described by Kuhn in 1962. This perspective would mean paradigms with distinct sets of ideas 
for each, in their own language, which would make them “incommensurable” with each other. 
Yet, what we need is to compare greatly different ideas and management patterns within this 
same framework. For that, we will admit that a “paradigm” in management is a set of ideas, 
questions and answers, which form the dominant business practices and thinking for a certain 
period of time and geographical area. Guillén (1994a) who also used this term noted that 
paradigms ought to have a normative approach, complete arguments and impact in more than 
one country. In this thesis we will describe paradigms by answering the following questions: 
What kind of business and social environment characterized the specific era? What were the 
main managerial questions and challenges? What were the answers and solutions and how 
were they diffused? We will make a difference between “paradigms” and the management 
practices of any specific company which are only a sort of mirror or layout of the actually 
dominant paradigm. 
2. Scientific management: the engineered production 
Management literature abounds in confirming Taylor’s Scientific Management from the 
1910s to be the first management “model” or “paradigm” (Pindur et al 1995)3. The difference 
compared to previously described practices was that a systematic, conscious and planned 
approach appeared in management. Why then, and why there? Were the 1900s clearly 
different for the working population than was the 19th century? We can argue that they were, 
first because factories grew much larger than ever before4. Size can be an advantage in terms 
of scale economy on one hand, but on the other, it represented a big challenge for the 
                                                 
3 See also in other works: (Guillén 1994a), (Wren 1994), (Waring 1991), or (Levie 1993). 
4 As an example, Ford employed 53,000 workers by 1919 (Wren 1994). 
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managerial society which was still lacking professional training. Organizing the work of such 
masses often turned into violence and created clear tension between blue and white-collars. In 
addition, those masses were generally uneducated, which hindered seriously the complex 
work with machines. 
Also, the 20th century was clearly different for the workers because a new professional 
group appeared in the more and more complex American companies: the engineers. Breaking 
the European dominance, the US became number one in number of engineers in 1900 – with 
Germany as second (Guillén 1994a). Familiar with numbers, they quickly became the 
business elite, often combining the professions of businessman and engineer. Both skills were 
important, as there was an urging need for methods dealing with labor unrest, with growing 
complexity in factories, and helping managers to gain further economies of scale 
(productivity). 
Charles Babbage (1791–1871), an English mathematician and engineer was among the 
firsts in Europe developing a rational, systematic approach to management, but his voice did 
not reach very far. Guillén (1994a) states that both in leading business literature and in 
practitioners’ writings, issues specific for Scientific Management appeared in the 1880s, and 
became dominant mainly in the 1910s and the early 1920s. Parallel to publications, techniques 
and ideas of the Scientific Management were taught in the curriculum of leading business 
schools as Wharton, Harvard, Dartmouth. Although the authors of those articles and books 
were numerous, the one with most of the fame, apostle of scientific approach in management 
was Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915). In spite of government investigations due to 
strikes in military factories5, and a general resistance from blue-collars, by 1915 his main 
ideas were introduced or at least tried in 140 establishments totaling 63.000 workers. The 
original appeal was important: Taylor proposed a system which could use unskilled workers 
instead of unionized, expensive and rare skilled workers, raise productivity and reduce 
organized resistance through pay rise. 
Taylor did not have any management background and after his apprenticeship, he 
started to work as a common laborer in 1878, and earned his scientific degree (mechanical 
engineering) in 1883, in a home study course while he was still working full time at Midvale 
Steel (Wren 1994). Although as a gentleman’s son, he had this unique experience of working 
with blue-collars. Taylor developed certain empathy for the workers’ point of view and his 
field experience helped him to understand the managerial problems of his era, like workers’ 
restriction of output, or the lack of management methods for proper job design and incentives. 
The pay system at that time in factories was often based on the daily or hourly wage, which 
did not encourage hard work. Piece-rate systems, even if introduced, proved to be a failure as 
standards were often poorly set, and management would have cut rates if workers earned too 
much. When he became a supervisor, Taylor was looking for a new industrial scheme to 
prevent the hitherto common, bitter labor-management encounters. Gabor (2000) wrote on 
this experience: “The combination of the technical complexity of Midvale’s military contracts 
and the surge in demand that followed the depression of the mid-1870s furnished much of the 
impetus for Taylor’s most innovative work at the company” (Gabor 2000, p. 12.). 
At Midvale, Taylor was looking for new standards, new industrial practices which led to 
time study, and he worked on a new incentive system where workers and employers could 
benefit together from the increased level of production. Since this pay system required 
accurate cost calculation, Taylor also pioneered standard cost accounting (to replace historical 
cost) and budgeting techniques, as better ways to measure performance. He established a new, 
scientific approach in management. 
                                                 
5 Taylor had several hearings from 1911 to 1912, especially due to strikes in the Watertown Arsenal. 
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Was he the only creator of these new ideas? Certainly not. James Watt and Matthew 
Robinson Boulton from Soho Engineering Foundry, Great Britain, introduced systematic and 
planned management techniques as early as in the late 1790s (Pindur et al 1995). We already 
mentioned the name of Babbage, who also established a systematic approach in Britain. But 
they were lacking the power of economies of scale to raise production to a weight high 
enough. During railway construction, McCallum created some system and designed the first 
org-charts to help organizing large companies. But still, the New World was waiting for a 
scientific man from large-scale industrial production who could create universally applicable 
managerial methods, solving all major labor-problems of that time. It happened to be Taylor, 
with his Scientific Management, which gave appropriate answer on how to deal with 
uneducated labor, workers’ resistance towards piece-rate pay, underperformance, and tensed 
manager-worker communication at the same time. He called it scientific because, for the first 
time, he calculated piece-rates by precise measurements: their base became facts instead of 
whims, estimation, or even past performance. Also, he designed the proper and sustainable 
way of performing each task through time study and calculation. His management philosophy 
was new, because he wanted to recognize and pay “first-class” workers instead of positions. 
As the result of several years of experiment, Taylor designed a system based on time study, 
performance standards, selection of workers, careful assignment to the right job, separation of 
planning from performance, task management and functional foremen (Taylor 1911). 
Taylor’s concept as a whole apparently failed in widespread practice as managerial 
tasks proved to be too complex for uneducated clerks (Wren 1994). Also, organized labor 
caused much trouble. His system ensured total and objective control both on workers and on 
clerks for the first time – he certainly gained enemies. That was in spite of his widely read 
books6 and the effectiveness of his system7, on which he was giving classes at Harvard from 
1909. Statistical evidence also shown that manufacturing output per working hour counted as 
100 in 1958 went from 21.2 in 1890 up to 52.0 in 1929 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census 1975)8. 
Taylor’s work was finally continued, polished and spread worldwide by his followers: 
Gantt, Barth, the Gilbreths, Brandeis, Le Chatelier, Emerson, and others. Especially Henry 
Laurence Gantt (1861–1919) was successful in this quest as one of the first management 
consultants and lecturer at numerous universities, with over 150 titles published, and more 
than a dozen inventions patented. As an example, the basis for the Soviet central planners to 
control their five-year plans was Gant’s work: his famous chart designed for project planning 
(Wren 1994). Also, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth improved the methodology of time-and-motion 
studies and Emerson made further clarification on efficiency (Luthans 1969). Due to these 
improvements, more and more managers and engineers accepted Scientific Management. 
World War I and the resource-efficiency promoted by Roosevelt played also an important role 
in its popularization. Beyond that, the biggest effect made by one single person may be the 
one of Brandeis in the Eastern Rate Case, who successfully proposed that Scientific 
Management can help the railways to gain efficiency, and cut cost without raising fare prices 
(Aldrich 2010). New disciplines as industrial psychology with Hugo Münsterberg, Social 
Gospel or industrial sociology also supported the efficiency movement, although already 
paving the way for more “human” solutions (Wren 1994). 
Going further with the practical impact, we must also mention the name of Ford and 
Bedaux. Henry Ford (1863–1947) made extensive use of Scientific Management techniques 
                                                 
6 Taylor’s most famous writings are his book ’Shop Management’ from 1903, and ’The Principles of Scientific Management’ 
from 1911. 
7 After Midvale, Taylor worked as a consultant for several companies where he could achieve spectacular raises in 
performance for lower labor cost. 
8 Cited by Wren (1994). 
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and improved its production process with gravity slides, automatic and endless-chain 
conveyors and other technological innovations. While speeding up the production line, Ford 
also increased the pay of his workers as Taylor proposed, although he disagreed with a few of 
Taylor’s ideas. Charles Eugene Bedaux (1887–1944) played also an important role due to his 
popularity as business consultant. He was working for raising efficiency with Scientific 
Management methods, for instance through the standardization of the time to spend on a 
specific task. Between 1918 and 1942, over 700 American companies with 675.000 workers 
were advised by Bedaux (Guillén 1994a). 
The era of Scientific Management marked not only companies but also other big 
organizations: Max Weber’s work (1947) contributed to the development of bureaucratic 
structures in general (for instance, in the state administration) serving as a basis for following 
organization theories, and Morris Cooke extended its main principles to educational and 
municipal organizations (Luthans 1969). 
At the same time, organized protest of workers nearly caused a civil war: in the US it 
reached higher level and was more savage than in any other industrialized country, especially 
between 1900 and 1920. Not only companies but also government and the courts were 
becoming increasingly hostile to unionism and accordingly, their membership declined from 
around 5 million in 1920 to 3.5 million in 1921 (Wren 1994). Blacklisting, strikebreaking, 
physical violence were common practices and employers attempted to attenuate tension by 
different ideologies like Social Darwinism or New Thought, justifying the subordination of 
employees. Critics also highlighted that some research data described by Taylor were simply 
not true, that he caused exploitation, ignored human nature of workers, and some observers 
even questioned to what extent Scientific Management was scientific (Marosi 1983). The shift 
to the HR movement could be considered as a failure of the paradigm, though both ideas and 
practices of Scientific Management survived the era (as did the Taylor Society), and can be 
found even today. 
3. Human relations: the“awakening” employee 
In the previous point we already listed some problems caused by the rise of large-scale 
industry; labor unrest appears to be on the top of that list. Scientific Management attempted 
though to give a technical solution to “soldiering” by increasing the size of the pie which 
could be divided between the owner and the workers. But wage appeal itself proved to be 
insufficient as strikes worsened and endangered profit. Continuous problems made shift 
general attention from the technical to the social-psychological aspects of work: that’s how a 
new paradigm arose from the uncooperative, individualistic background of the Scientific 
Management based on American Puritanism, Social Darwinism, and New Thought9. 
What was different in the 1920s, compared to thirty or twenty years earlier? The slower 
immigration, the electrification of the industry, and urbanization certainly had an important 
effect on society (Guillén 1994a). American labor prospered, too, witnessing real wages to 
double between 1865 and 1890, and once more from 1890 to 1921. In parallel increased life 
expectancy, and the average industrial work week decreased from 60 hours in 1890 to 55 
hours in 1910, and then to 50 hours in 1920 (Wren 1994). In addition to these better 
conditions, Scientific Management apparently generated a need for greater welfare and better 
cooperation with unions in companies, some care that workers would have appreciated as 
human beings. 
Psychology gained broader acceptance as early as during the Scientific Management era 
for its role in supporting selection at workplace. Also, corporate care on personnel was not a 
new idea: before industrialization business was more family-sized with paternalistic 
                                                 
9 For more details, see Wren 1994. 
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management. Early factory owners, such as Robert Owen (1771–1858) or Benjamin Seebohm 
Rowntree (1871–1954) provided a large scale of company benefits to the workers like meals, 
housing, education, health care, recreation, or dancing lessons. Owen also set up cheap 
company stores and raised the minimum age for working children (Pindur et al 1995). 
Welfare services were developed in large companies from the 1900s, and here women 
played an increasing role: it can be that they had managerial career opportunities for the first 
time in business. In the 1910s, the term “welfare work” was replaced by “employment 
management” and the first professional organizations for personnel staff specialists were 
born. One of the model organizations of the Taylor system, Plimpton Press, created its 
employment department and named the first employment manager in 1910 (Wren 1994). 
The somewhat symbolic beginning of the Human Relations paradigm is usually 
associated with the Hawthorne studies, although Hawthorne was not initiated as a 
breakthrough research. It began as a Scientific Management-inspired experiment in 1924, 
conducted by a professor of electrical engineering from MIT, who was looking for enhanced 
productivity while bettering light conditions (Gillespie 1991). As during the research 
performance tended to rise regardless to lighting, the illumination tests were abandoned in 
1927 concluding that there were too many variables, among which “the most important could 
be the psychology of the human individual” (Wren 1994, p. 236.). That’s how the 
management of Hawthorne plant (Western Electric) decided that the experiments should 
continue. Two new researchers took on further studies and to test new hypotheses, a control 
group was also added to the experiment. 
One researcher came from MIT (Clair E. Turner), looking at fatigue and mental 
attitudes. The second was the Harvard professor George Elton Mayo (1880–1949). It was 
known that dealing with the problems of workers, Mayo does not try to explain the situation 
by one factor but looks at the whole context from a mainly psychological perspective (Mayo, 
1923)10. One of his greatest merits was certainly the new methods introduced in 1929 for 
interviewing the subjects of the research, which made the interviews more conversational: 
their average length went from 30 to 90 minutes. As a result of the study on one hand, it 
became clear that the simple action of being listened to made the workers feel better about 
their conditions, even if this improvement was only a false impression. On the other hand, 
workers’ complaints during the interviews often proved to be irrelevant to facts, unveiling 
hidden personal problems from the private life of workers11. Interviewers step-by-step 
separated a manifest and a latent side of each phenomena. Then, after another comparative 
experiment in 1931, researchers finally concluded that management must “take into account 
sentiments along with the logic of efficiency. This position resulted in the admonition to 
management to view every organization as a social system” (Wren 1994, p. 246.)12. 
The Hawthorne research made it clear that pure technical skills were not enough for 
successfully managing people. There was a need for a good sense of diagnosis to understand 
human behavior, and interpersonal skills to be able to motivate, engage, lead and 
communicate with workers, or somehow deal with the shock of the 1929 stock market crash 
and the following economic depression13. But first-line supervisors with both technical-
economic and human relation skills were rather rare in the early 1930s… 
                                                 
10 Cited by Wren 1994. 
11 For instance, complaints on the air pollution were found irrelevant to the facts but the interviewee’s brother happened to be 
recently died of pneumonia. 
12 The findings of the experiment are written down more in details by William J. Dickson, chief of employee relations 
research department at Hawthorne, and Fritz J. Roethlisberger, also from Harvard, who joined the research project after Mayo 
(Roethlisberger–Dickson 1939). 
13 Unemployment rate rose to about 25% and the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932 protected unions and supported the 
unionization of workers (Skaggs–Leicht 2005). 
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The new paradigm, called HR (Human Relations) movement, emerged as a response to 
this need in two waves (from the 30s to the mid-40s on one hand, and from the late-1940s on 
the other), with ambassadors mainly from social and psychological sciences. Those sciences 
apparently developed as a means to give more scientific basis to practical ideas, like 
Lawrence J. Henderson with Paretian sociology, or Elton Mayo with Hawthorne. For Levie 
(1993), the first true representative of the first wave, in the 1920s, was Mary Parker Follett, 
followed by Mayo and Roethlisberger. Wren adds Chester I. Barnard, Jacob L. Moreno and 
Henderson to the list. 
Effectiveness and productivity remained first target for the HR advocates, like it was for 
the Scientific Management, only their ways of achieving it differed. When McGregor wrote 
about it first, he could only hope that a more positive attitude towards workers (the “Y-view”) 
would be developed and would improve management, although the reality of the late 50s was 
still not that bright (McGregor 1960). Mayo’s toolbox for managerial problems was more 
about listening, using group pressure for at least standard performance and initiating worker 
participation. Using the metaphor of Scientific Management, we can call the early stage of 
HR a closed system, where workers perform predefined tasks, and call the latter phase an 
opening system, were people have the skills to solve problems, in connection to their work 
environment, and not only perform tasks (Bakacsi 2011). 
The above mentioned second wave of the HR movement started in the late 1940s14. Its 
leading scientists were Chris Argyris, F. L. W. Richardson, Jr., C. R. Walker, Arthur N. 
Turner, or Rensis Likert, Kurt Z. Lewin, Abraham H. Maslow, Frederick I. Herzberg, Douglas 
McGregor, Alex F. Osborn, Robert R. Blake and Jane Mouton15. Reaching the 40s, HR 
interest went more towards job enlargement and enrichment, work design, rotation, 
motivation, leadership, group dynamics, participative management. Finally in the late 1950s, 
Keith Davis redefined HR and wrote an important book with a modern approach of it, 
differentiating the terms “organizational behavior” for the understanding of human behavior, 
and “human relations” for the application of this understanding to operational situations 
(Davis 1957)16. Equipped with more knowledge on motivation, the second wave of HR went 
further in transforming jobs and interpersonal relations. Organizational Behavior and decision 
making theories delegated more power to the employees, henceforth decision makers, than 
before, while employees got also better educated (skilled) and better socialized at work 
(motivated) from the 1950s. Yet, up to this point, two of the main authors of the Human 
Relations paradigm have been ignored because of a difficulty to categorize them as either the 
first or the second wave. Considered as transitional figures, their work created a link between 
the two waves in a sense. Yet regardless to their category, Barnard and Simon merit our 
special attention. 
Scholar from Harvard17 but first of all management practitioner, Chester Barnard 
(1886–1961) made great theoretical contributions to the field of management study. He is 
credited as the creator of numerous theories, including acceptance theory of authority, the role 
of informal organization, the functional and dysfunctional aspects of status systems, the 
importance of and nature of decision processes, or the role of the executive organization as a 
communications system. Denying the validity of economic models on the rationality of 
human beings, and as a contrary to the transaction cost theory, he stated that organizations 
come into existence simply when there are people who are able to communicate with each 
other, they are willing to contribute to action, and they do this for a common purpose. This 
system, called organization, can be maintained when equilibrium is created between the 
                                                 
14 That is also when the HR finally found its ways into the management mainstream. 
15 For more information on the first vs. second HR waves, see Waring (1991). 
16 Cited in Wren 1994. 
17 He actually did not finish his degree when he left Harvard in 1909 (Witzel 2005). 
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system and its external environment on one hand, and within the system itself on the other 
(Witzel 2005). Another breakthrough theory from Barnard deals with the acceptance of 
authority based on free will and outside forces: he identified a “level of acceptance” under 
which employees would accept orders from managers automatically, without any questioning 
process. This level is set by non-written norms and understanding of cooperation and trust, 
and accordingly, the employee would accept a directive if he understood it, was able to follow 
it, and he believed it was appropriate regarding the organizational goals, at least as the 
employee understood them (Barnard 1938). Under this new light, managers were not giving 
orders anymore but gaining the cooperation of their employees (more and more capable to 
make decisions by themselves which is further developed by Simon). But Barnard not only 
redefined theories on authority, cooperation and communication: he was also able to develop 
a wider perspective of organizations, wider than their formal structures, and identify them by 
their investors, suppliers, customers, or other contributors as well (Barnard 1948). 
Herbert A. Simon (1916–2001) was greatly influenced by Barnard in developing his 
theory about “bounded rationality”. In his classic Administrative Behavior, he criticized that 
management would be based on principles, as in the work of Gulick, Urwick, or even Fayol, 
and called for a new theoretical framework able to deal with the real causes of bureaucratic 
disease, not only symptoms. As a key to this new framework, he described the psychology of 
decision making in organizations. He stated that rationally behaving individuals do not 
optimize their situation but make decisions, based on the environmental constraints, which are 
good enough rather than optimal (Simon 1947). This emphasis on “open system” (in 
connection with the environment), acquired with his colleague James March, will be 
mentioned in the next point. 
Contrary to previous studies, like the one of Bendix (1974) which claimed HR was 
merely an ideology, Guillén (1994a) affirms that there was an important practical impact of 
HR techniques. Adoption of HR techniques was often associated with the creation of 
personnel departments but also concrete techniques have been implemented into corporate 
practices. New institutes and research groups have been formed, especially in the US and the 
UK. Their basis was often Gestalt psychology and Social Gospel. The work of Jacob L. 
Moreno (1892–1974) must be highlighted as he developed sociometry, an analytical 
technique for representing interpersonal relationships on a so-called sociogram, but also 
psychodrama and sociodrama, serving rather therapeutic purposes (Moreno 1953). Another 
important construct for analyzing behavior was group dynamics, credited generally to Kurt 
Lewin (1890–1947) and his famous leadership studies. For the benefit of forthcoming 
company practices, Lewin also found that changes in behavior were more easily induced 
through group participation and involvement than through simple orders (Lewin 1948). 
According to Wren (1994), this also led to his unfreezing-refreezing theory on change. Other 
techniques from this era included human relations training or sensitivity training (increasing 
interpersonal awareness), suggestion systems, magazines & newspapers directed to employees 
for better communication, brainstorming and group discussion methods, job enlargement and 
enrichment, psychological testing of personality traits, morale survey, etc. Knowing 
themselves better in relationship to others apparently fostered the workers’ emotional and 
moral well-being, essential to group cohesion (Locke 1996). 
Accordingly, teamwork, leadership and trained managers became highly emphasized 
during and after World War II. “Founded on the Mayoists’ call for socially skilled 
supervisors, enhanced by the ideas and techniques of Moreno and Lewin, and carried out in 
research centers and associations, human relations training reached its apogee in the 1950s” 
(Wren 1994, p. 281.). Also, individual incentives promoted by Taylor gradually faded 
compared to group incentives. In 1945, research directed by Rensis Likert (University of 
Michigan) shown that employee orientation rather than production orientation in leadership 
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led to higher productivity and less turnover. At the same time in the Ohio State University, 
instead of identifying a single style which leads to the best results, researchers differentiated 
more dimensions in every situation as in the contingency theory. With his research done in the 
restaurant industry, William Foote Whyte gave important contribution to the meaning of 
“status” as a motivator at the workplace (Whyte 1948)18. 
For a complete picture of the Human Relations paradigm, we must also look at its 
ambiguous impact on the labor soldiering problem. Needless to neglect, HR was not made to 
represent workers, but at least it did not attack unions directly. Mayoists looked at the worker 
from the management’s perspective and accepted the need for “using” them as a means to 
higher productivity and lower costs. Also they didn’t bring any alternative to solve industrial 
conflict (e.g., collective bargaining). Briefly, they didn’t really take unions into account for 
building social solidarity. Moreover, unions’ voice raised when techniques like “moral 
surveys” were introduced, creating direct communication between workers and management 
and contouring labor leaders (Guillén 1994a). These strong lines of “power games” can make 
some of the reasons to usually neglect unions in developing main management ideas. Labor 
seemed to gain substantial power through legislation in the 30s (i.e. the Norris-La Guardia 
Act of 1932), which made resistance actually worse than it was in the 20s. However, from the 
mid-1930s, strikes and tension decreased again and organized labor caused henceforth less 
trouble for companies. Other critics of HR state that rather than defining a new ideology, it 
was just a revival of earlier humanist thinking driven by the prestige of Harvard and MIT to 
build a “conflict-free dream” although conflicts are necessary (Wren 1994). Authors also 
question the credibility of Mayo as evidences prove that his will was to show that material 
incentives play only a secondary role in productivity. 
To sum up, the HR paradigm, with all of its merits and valuable contributions, was not 
wrong: it just became “too big”, exaggerated, compared to its scientific content. At least, from 
the 1950s, it could not bring appropriate answers anymore for several new managerial 
challenges. By that time companies were massively internationalizing which still needed good 
communication, interpersonal and intercultural skills. However, only skills were not enough 
as bad structures were often blocking further growth and international development. As 
summarized by Wren (1994): “after World War II, the search for general management theory 
would emerge as a solution to the complexities of managing in the modern era” (Wren 1994, 
p. 342.). 
4. Structural revolution and open systems 
The United States enjoyed nearly unlimited markets until the 1950s when arrived to a point of 
saturation. In parallel, the international environment had only limited impact on the 
development of American capitalism, except for the two wars (Guillén 1994a). Then, the 
Marshall Plan and the postwar period brought new international opportunities for the hitherto 
stagnating USA: the end World War II meant economic recovery due to new markets, new 
products, and new technologies. This opening also brought a greater need for coordinating 
product development, manufacturing, and marketing on a world scale with adequate corporate 
structures. Management had to shift from the prewar production oriented practices to a new, 
“top-management” viewpoint coping with the increasing need for coordination, the larger-
scale enterprises and markets, and the better-educated workforce. From a specialized 
standpoint, managers had to grow into generalists able to manage specialists. A new era came 
with business expansion and diversification.  
The 50s and 60s are the era of “organization men” with tremendous opportunities for 
management careers in internationalizing companies. While increasing size, becoming more 
                                                 
18 Cited by Wren (1994, p. 289.). 
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complex and decentralized, corporations massively adopted M-form structures and therefore 
expanded middle-management ranks. By the mid-1950s half of the largest American 
manufacturing firms were operating under multidivisional structure (Fruin 1992). Chandler in 
1962 and Palmer et al. in 1987 claimed that the multidivisional form replaced the unitary 
(functional) form as the prevalent administrative structure among large American 
corporations. Palmer et al. introduce the M-form structure as a practical way to “regulate the 
nature and extent of territorial growth both within and between nations” (Palmer et al 1987, p. 
25.). Also in the early 1950s, a new system theory was developed by Bertalanffy, followed by 
the development of the contingency theory as described in the previous chapter. Herbert 
Simon, with his colleague James March, stated that the classical principles of organization 
were incompatible with their actual contexts and therefore projected the birth of new ideas, 
new frameworks, or perhaps a new paradigm. 
As noted by Locke (1996), a “single-product, single-function” enterprise, like railways, 
had to be managed at two levels: day-to-day operations and central decisions. The “single-
product multi-function” firm, integrating forward and backward, needed administration also 
for elaborate marketing and raw material procurement. But the “multi-product multi-function” 
firms with even more layers could not organize their operation in the old, functional structure 
anymore. They had to split management into divisions with a full set of functional 
departments for each19. The diversification of firms, as the M&A, also increased the role of 
controllers and financial experts, who could provide accurate information on the performance 
of different parts20. With the development of the contingency theory, authors sought to 
identify all valid elements of the environment and build a model leading towards 
“organizational fit” or a better match between their structure and the environment. Examples 
are works from Chandler (1962), Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) or from Mintzberg (1981). 
Obviously, there are not many managers who wouldn’t manage according to the 
situation or circumstances. But we must not underestimate the power of focus on the 
environment in management research, consulting and education, in a world where the 
business elite used to seek to enhance performance by mainly looking into the organization 
(production process, employee welfare, etc.). Parallel to its impact on organizational structure, 
the situational approach gained terrain also in leadership (Fiedler et al)21, or in Strategic 
Management developing in the 1970s (e.g. SWOT analysis). Thus, in this quest for 
organizational fit, a robust organization theory had to be developed as to provide a framework 
for researchers. 
Thus, management education developed based on Henri Fayol and later theorists such a 
William H. Newman, George Terry, Harold Koontz, Peter Drucker or Cyril O’Donnell (Wren 
1994). The number of undergraduates studying management grew each year after the 1950s; 
being already 370,000 in 1950 (nearly double the ones in engineering). A real breakthrough 
was brought by the graduate business schools and the MBA programs: 4,814 graduates in 
1960, 23,400 in 1970, 49,000 in 1980, 70,000 in 1990 (Locke 1996). 
The framework of the internationalizing and bureaucratizing firms with the increased 
care for general theories on management and organizational structure was named “Structural 
Analysis” by Guillén (1994a). In this paper, we named it Structural Revolution to highlight its 
impact on organizational structures and management education. Completing the work of 
Henri Fayol and Max Weber, the forerunners of the Structural Revolution paradigm felt that 
efficient structures and operation of organizations were an alternative to the Mayoist school to 
solve the misery of the economic holocaust of 1929. They attempted to develop the “right” 
management functions and structures, stressing these as means to both employee satisfaction 
                                                 
19 Of course not entirely new, the multidivisional structure was used already in the eighteenth century by the French military. 
20 Mainly through ROI (Return-On-Investment) and other similar indicators. 
21 For more information, see Bakacsi (1996). 
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and productivity. In a sense, especially compared to HR ideas, the toolbox of the Structural 
Revolution meant a return to the “hard” side of management. We count among these early 
advocates for example, James D. Mooney (a General Motors executive), C. Canby 
Balderston, Charles L. Jamison and William N. Mitchell (professors who initiated the 
founding of the Academy of Management), Luther Gulick and Lyndall F. Urwick, or Ralph C. 
Davis22. 
We do not have precise measurements or any representative survey indicating to what 
extent managers took into account these authors, but the practical impact of the Structural 
Revolution paradigm is hard to overestimate mainly due to the rise of the consultancy 
business. Consultants and the mainstream literature all popularized the contingency approach. 
It was logical, easy to understand, close to the needs of internationalizing companies, so 
managers just followed the wave. McKinsey; Robert Heller & Associates; Cresap; 
McCormick and Paget; Booz, Allen and Hamilton; A. T. Kearney and others assisted to 
countless structural reorganizations in the US, seeking for a more adapted, better fit 
organization (Guillén 1994a). 
Structural Revolution, with the context of open systems certainly shown the way and 
originated many new thought, although it had its critics as well. Several researchers in social 
sciences deplored, on one hand, the analogy with plants and animals. They claimed that 
success in human organizations was more complex than adaptation and survival and that 
congruency or fit theories could help to explain the past but not to “predict what fits will lead 
to high performance in the future” (Wren 1994, p. 392.). Indeed, compared to the Scientific 
Management and HR movements which promised a better world in a utopian way, the 
paradigm of Structural Revolution remained rather vague about the future. On the other hand, 
we still remember the debate on contingency determinism, described in Chapter 1. Criticisms 
from the 1970s denied what the early findings suggested: that a change in contingency would 
directly cause a move within the organization in order to reset the best possible fit. These 
debates attenuated however, and the contingency theory of organizational structure, basic 
theory of the Structural Revolution, continues to be a mainstream theory for organizations. 
5. Strategies for the global competition 
Management and organizational theories massively emerged from the 1950s to help 
managers’ education, but some had their doubts on how well these theories were implemented 
in the practice of management. The modest (1.5–4%) rate of growth of American companies 
was later shadowed by the spectacular rise of other countries. Whereas in 1950, the US 
provided half of the world’s industrial output, this became only 21 percent by the mid-1980s. 
And the same figure went up to 19 percent for a new competitor challenging the US 
hegemony: Japan (Locke 1996). Moreover, for the first time in the history of developed 
nations, the trade balance of the US and then many other Western countries had been broken 
by this “developing” country. This trade deficit kept growing even after the Plaza accord and 
reached in 1986, despite the dollar’s plunge, a record 148 billion dollar; in contrast to the 
Japanese 56 billion trade surplus with the US (Tsurumi 1987). This emerging, new 
“competition” had huge impacts on the status quo of developed countries: both on economy 
and on society as a whole. 
In the 1980s, the US (Carter and Reagan) initiated a huge deregulation campaign to free 
the economy. The strength of unions declined seriously with a constantly falling private-
sector membership. Interest rates escalated high along with the reinforcing international 
competition which led to job losses, loose labor market and decreasing power of the HR 
departments. From the 70s, strategic planning and forecasting emerged as a new-old corporate 
                                                 
22 For more details on these authors, see Wren (1994. pp. 295–313.) 
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function in order to help companies to improve competitiveness. Thus, parallel to 
deregulation, the 70s and 80s opened up an enlarged, global competition for the American 
firms, never experienced before. This competition made the business sector rethink efficiency, 
productivity, and competitiveness. New functions were needed in order to find ways to 
survive and to compete, and real strategic thinking which simple strategic planning could not 
provide (Mintzberg 1994). New, instant solutions had to be found. Theorists and practitioners 
tended to look abroad for best practices in order to find remedies for the lost productivity. 
This research led to Japan and made her a management example not only for the US, but to 
the whole industrialized world. 
Prominent books soon appeared on the managers’ bookshelves on the rising Japan, 
especially from Vogel (1979), Pascale–Athos (1981), Ouchi (1981), or Ohmae (1982). This 
list can be topped by the broadcast (24 June 1980) of the NBC White Paper (If Japan Can, 
Why Can’t We), the 1980 Special Issue of Business Week (The Reindustrialization of 
America), or the countless articles throughout the 1980s in the Quality Progress, The Harvard 
Business Review, the Fortune and other specialized journals. Deming Societies were founded 
in every region; the Association for Manufacturing Excellence was created… to name only a 
few events highlighting the theoretical impact of the new competition. “For the first time, 
beginning in the late 1970s, American management found itself singled out for its 
shortcomings in terms of efficiency among capitalists forms of management” (Locke 1996, p. 
5.). This entire echo gave to the Japan focus a huge theoretical impact, fueled by the Nippon 
economic success. After a content analysis of California Management Review, Locke (1996) 
confirmed that during the decade of the 80s the topic of Japan rose in a spectacular way, 
leading to 1985–86 when the journal indexed Japan as a “special” category. In parallel, the 
popular business weekly, Fortune, granted 2.4 percent of its article content to the Japanese 
business and manufacturing, or American subjects related to the Japanese challenge, in 1980. 
The same figure rose to 9–15 percent for the following years. To sum up, the theoretical 
impact of Japan rising and redesigning global competition was doubtlessly heavy in the USA. 
Beyond that however, we must understand its general significance for the American 
management history and the paradigm-framework of this thesis. 
One of the most important concepts of the 1970s and 80s was called “Lean 
Management” which, among other factors, led to a redefinition of management in general: it 
characterized indeed the era’s management philosophy and practices. Guillén (1994b) 
mentioned two “great managerial trends” for the late 80s: lean production and total quality 
management, which leads us to the practical impact of the paradigm. Guillén calls them 
trends; they are indeed not simply production-line techniques but methods with impact on the 
services sector and the general organization of work as well. Their impact is such an 
important one that it seems to be adequate to reformulate them into a more general, 
philosophical setting. 
Our first main point with this period is the emergence of strategy and strategic thinking 
in business. In Darwinian competition (even in trade and commerce) random chance is the 
major factor. As Henderson pointed out: “In fact, business and biological competition would 
follow the same pattern of gradual evolutionary change except for one thing” –which was for 
him the strategy (Henderson, 1989, p. 140.). Peter Drucker stated in 1954, that decisions that 
really matter were “strategic”. Chandler described strategy as influencing organizational 
structure of firms (1962). From issues concerning planning and forecasting in the 1960s and 
70s, strategy evolved in common American business press as well23. Concluding previous 
thoughts, and based on the ideas of Drucker and Chandler, Igor Ansoff (1918–2002) 
formulated his book on corporate strategy (1965) and built a comprehensive framework for 
                                                 
23 As observed during the content analysis of Harvard Business Review articles. 
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further contributions. The contribution of Ansoff, also called the father of strategic 
management, cannot be overestimated: his strategic product-market matrix, his contingency 
view of strategic management or the strategic decision making are taught and known 
worldwide. Even the term strategic management can be credited to him: what he previously 
described, he renamed later the action of formulating objectives and plans on an analysis of 
the environment as “strategic management” (Ansoff 1976).  
The other important element leading to the new paradigm was globalization, the 
extreme widening of the competitive area. According to the findings of Gause and Witt 
(1935)24 from the University of Moscow, two small living creatures could survive and persist 
together, given a certain amount a food in a bottle if different species, but two of the same 
specie could not. When competing for the same essential resource or food, one of the two, 
sooner or later displaced the other. The bottle in this experiment gives us the area of 
competition whereas the food is the living basis (income) of firms. According to the example 
taken from biology25, companies which are “perfectly” identical, making their livings in the 
same way, cannot coexist in the long run in the same area of competition. Thus, through 
globalization and the development of information and transportation technologies, this 
competition area is widened nearly to the whole planet! The widening arena became a matter 
of fact with the rising Japan and other emerging economies from Asia, while the economies of 
Latin-America or Africa will soon take their stakes as well. 
We may conclude from the biological experience that only competitive strengths, 
unique skills can ensure for a living entity or firm a unique advantage in getting resources it 
requires, and therefore maintaining certain equilibrium in the area of competition. The same 
conclusion led Porter to write his famous book series on competitive advantage26. The idea 
that strategies like product differentiation or focus on niche are necessary alternatives to cost 
leadership for companies, in order to successfully compete and survive, became a key for the 
American business to recover from the competitive crisis of the 1970s and early 80s. “Each 
must be different enough to have a unique advantage”, argued Henderson (1989, p.140.), and 
they can survive. This idea proved to be true even with the cheaper Asian competitors and, as 
just one example, saved Harley Davidson after its bankruptcy (Porter et al 2000). Moreover, 
with Japan becoming number two economy in terms of GDP, more than before, American 
companies needed to differentiate themselves from their competitors, and create a stronger 
sense of belonging through corporate culture: a clearer identification of “us vs. our 
competitors”. The force of difference or culture encouraged employees to give more effort for 
the same price, and customers to pay more for nearly the same product closer to their “heart”. 
One is tempted to conclude that the Japanese success was indeed the main cause leading 
to the rise of strategic management. However, the argument of this thesis is that the Global 
Competition paradigm is far beyond Japan’s influence. It is true that the answers and tools for 
the competitiveness challenge came basically from there in the 1980s. But if Japan didn’t 
exist, the same wave would have arrived a few years later from China or Korea. Thus, we 
believe that the practical impact is credited more to the competition with emerging economies 
than merely to the uniqueness of the Japanese production systems. Beyond real success stories 
in some cases, the adoption itself of these techniques, the difficulties of transplantation and 
cooperation with the Japanese managers, the cultural differences caused in fact heavy troubles 
in many American corporations. By Japanese standards, workers in the US lacked loyalty to 
the company, had too high salary claims, and were still commanded in a bad, Taylorist sense. 
                                                 
24 Cited by Henderson (1989). 
25 The example is obviously an exaggeration as we have seen with the critics of Structural Revolution, but serves as a good 
illustration on the globalizing competition in business. 
26 His most famous ideas are the five forces of profitability or the “diamond model”; the value chain of firms; or the generic 
strategies cited above (low cost, product differentiation, and focus). For more details, see Porter (1980 or 1985). 
 451
Japanese typically criticized American managers for their lack of commitment, and abuse of 
power, whereas Americans resisted assimilation and sometime cooperation (Locke 1996). As 
a possible solution, Ouchi was for long time looking for a hybrid type of organization, 
combining advantages from both the American and the Japanese side, but with limited proven 
impact on practice (Ouchi–Jaeger 1978). 
Partly due to the cultural differences previously mentioned, the Global Competition 
paradigm had also its critics. Like Scientific Management, the lean production concept could 
not be implemented as a whole in different organizations. As Dohse, Jürgens, and Malsch 
argued: “The contemporary Japanese management works within a system of industrial 
relations that limits the articulation of collective interests by employees. The Japanese 
organization of the labor process is, therefore, not easily transferable; it is at best possible to 
adopt some of its elements” (Guillén 1994b, pp. 82–83.). Strategic planning also received 
wide critics as for many authors strategy is not about plans but about “insights”. That is at 
least the point for Campbell and Alexander (1997) who argue that “strategy development is 
the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with 
planning, which is about turning insights into action” (p. 42.). The message that firms should 
separate strategy development from implementation is also confirmed by Mintzberg (1994). 
Others even added that the future could not be predicted anyway and so completely new ways 
were needed to think about strategy in uncertainty (Courtney et al 1997). 
These critics don’t mean, however, that strategic management would not have brought 
appropriate answers to the challenge set by Japan and newly emerging countries. In the early 
1990s, the US could finally march towards the 21st century with stronger, more reactive firms 
and better economic figures. As a sign of good corporate performance, in the late 90s, the US 
had the lowest unemployment rate since the 60s; and the forthcoming lost of the hegemonic 
status quo did not harm much its regained competitiveness. At the same time, the US also 
became much more shareholder-oriented than before (see the next part on finances), firms 
have been following typically short-term financial goals based on stock market information. 
Even since then, as Jacoby (2007) pointed out, except for employee ownership cases, full 
stakeholder view in the US remains extremely rare. 
6. Conclusions 
Writers can basically attempt to approach management history in five different ways. These 
different approaches are: (1) discussing management developments of a given time period; (2) 
using the “schools” way; (3) the institutional approach with focus on events; (4) the 
biography-based study of famous people; and (5) the combining of ideas and biographies 
(Gibson et al 1999). In this paper we basically used a time-based model, but our theoretical 
framework made it possible to use this time-line approach to define paradigms, categorize 
schools, and to better understand the life of management gurus or events at the same time.  
The aim of this paper was to identify typical managerial dilemmas, philosophy and 
practices characterizing each period of time since mass production has been in use. These 
paradigms were certainly adequate for the socio-economic circumstances of each given 
period, but the solutions proposed by a paradigm did not stop with a new paradigm emerging. 
Scientific Management was resurrected as automation, management science, operations 
research, or management information systems, described as quantitative management 
movement by Pindur et al (1995) or as mathematical school by Koontz (1961 or 1980). 
Human Relations covers also latter organization behavior, personnel management, human 
resources management, empowerment, etc.; or the Human behavior (Koontz) or Behavioral 
schools (Luthans). Structural Revolution was based first on contingency theory of structure, 
but initiated also general management theories and management education, theories of 
international firms, the study of matrix and virtual structures, and so on. Accordingly, it 
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contains references to the Management process school, and even to the Empirical school 
(Koontz 1961), or the System approach (Pindur et al 1995). Global Competition stands for the 
study of Japanese business but also for competition in general, strategic planning or strategic 
management, and corresponds to the strategic management and Japanese-style management 
and even the excellence approaches described by Pindur et al. Thus, our summary of 
management paradigms ought to help management thinkers to place techniques or practices in 
their original context. But beyond that historical contribution, this review of paradigms gives 
us another, more pragmatic idea as well.  
After the industrial revolution, the United States could emerge and defeat the European 
economies on their markets due to the mass-production and the resulting cheaper prices, 
despite expensive labor and transportation. Early paradigms reflected the rule of scale 
economy. The big change occurred in the 80s when the US nearly lost its hegemony against 
the high quality goods produced by cheaper labor in emerging industrialized economies. The 
new paradigm found new ways to compete beside scale economies and price: differentiation, 
communication of values, and the establishment of an emotional-driven consumer behavior. 
Global competition makes this new model, what we can paraphrase as Paradigm 2.0, a must 
for other economies as well (Porter et al 2000). Curiuously, Japan, formerly the main 
competitor, takes longer time than expected to adopt a “2.0 paradigm” and other scale-
oriented economies face the same problem. The teaching of the Global Competition paradigm 
may show the way of sustainability for those economies. 
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